Many Arabs,
thirsty for real change, look at the events of the Arab Spring positively.
Liberal, secular, conservative, and ultraconservative groups and individuals in
the countries transformed by the Arab Spring who supported the overthrow of the
old guard agree that these revolutions were necessary. They disagree on the
post-revolution arrangement. The Arab Spring 2.0 that took place in Egypt on
June 30th is a good example of the disagreement between former allies about the
future of the new Arab World. Analysts and observers of Middle East affairs are
trying to make sense out of something that does not operate according to common
sense. All that can be done is a sound analysis of the facts. I have received
several inquiries for comments about the events in Egypt. A summary of these
comments might provide some legal and historical context.
1. Did the
Egyptian military orchestrate a military coup against the “legitimate”
president Mohamed Morsi?
Morsi and the
Muslim Brotherhood believe that the military staged a military coup against the
legitimacy (shar`iyya). Morsi made that clear in his last speech when he repeated the word “shar`iyya”
about 100 times in a 21-minute address. The fact of the matter is that millions
of Egyptians came to the streets and squares on June 30 demanding that he
resigns because he failed to achieve the goals of the revolution. Morsi and the
Muslim Brotherhood responded by calling on their supporters to come down to the
street as well instead of addressing the demands of the protesters. The military
sided with the June 30th protest movement which was seen as a
continuation of the 2011 revolutioners. In other words, if millions of
Egyptians did not rebel against Morsi, the military would not have taken the
steps it had taken. The question then becomes, why did so many Egyptians rebel
against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood?
2. If Morsi is
the legitimate president, could protesters ask for his resignation?
First, let’s
look at it from the point of view of classical Islamic institutions--since Morsi
and the Muslim Brotherhood subscribe to that ideology. In Islamic law (the
foundation of the Brotherhood platform), political legitimacy is a contract. In
fact, the act of electing/selecting a political leader in pre-modern Islamic
societies is called bay`ah-a derivative of the word that means
selling/buying. Contracts in Islamic law come with built-in clause called khiayar
(option), which deals with cases of breach of contract. Political legitimacy,
therefore, being a form of contractual arrangement, leaves room for forcing out
a political leader.
Historically,
the terms of political legitimacy in Islam were spelled out during the
selection of the first caliph, Abu Bakr. Upon taking over, he declared the
following: “You have elected me, and I am not necessarily better than you. Obey
me as long as I obeyed God. If I disobeyed God, then there is no obligation
upon you to obey me.” These terms were the guiding principles of the so-called
righteously guided caliphs during the formative period of Islamic institutions
and beyond. It was the violation of these terms that legitimized the civil wars
and armed uprisings during that era. If a legitimate caliph violated what is
seen as the terms of a contract, Islamic law allowed for his removal, first by
asking for his resignation, and if he refuses, then by force—as was the case
during the rule of the third caliph `Uthman. The legal precedent in Islamic law
is there. In some cases, it was not just the case of some marginalized minority
rebelling against the elite. Member of the ruling elite rose up militarily
against legitimate caliphs. The widow of the Prophet Muhammad, `A’ishah, led a
rebellion against the legitimate caliph, Ali. These are historical facts.
Second, in
modern times, there are institutional paths that allow the “people” to remove a
democratically elected leader if circumstances warrant it. For example, in the
United States, Congress acts on behalf of the people to impeach a president.
In other words,
electoral legitimacy is not a carte blanche that would allow an elected leader
to act above and beyond the law. Electoral legitimacy is not absolute. The
question, then, is not about whether it is legitimate to overthrow Morsi, rather,
if he had committed acts that warrant his removal. That is the substantive
question. Some facts show that it is his own actions and inaction that may have
facilitated his removal by the masses—aided by the military.
The revolution
was about changing political system. He was supposed to implement the demands
of the revolution and that included building new governing institutions. He did
not act. Instead, he decided to consolidate power by not holding
parliamentarian elections after the cancellation of the first one on
constitutional grounds. That same institution that was supposed to check his
powers, parliament, could have saved his presidency and he has only himself to
blame. It would have been harder for the street and the military to overthrow
him had acted quickly and held fair parliamentarian elections. It would have been
harder for them to quash two elected institutions not just one.
3. Is the
removal of Morsi a repeat of scenario of Algeria and a continuation of a trend
whereby the secular elite deprives Islamists from gaining power through
democratic means?
There was no
question that the Algerian military acted without authority and without reason
(other than fear of Islamists) when it nullified the results of the first round
of elections and cancelled subsequent ones. But the events in Egypt are very
different. Indeed Egyptian military brass does not like the Brotherhood in
charge and they have done all they could to keep them from taking over. But
when members of the Brotherhood and the Salafis were elected, the military
accepted the results. When the Brotherhood fielded presidential candidates,
despite its leaders’ promises not to do so, and won the presidency, the
military did not stage a coup. After a year in power, it was clear that the
Brotherhood, like the military before it, was interested in consolidating power
and writing the rules in a way that will exclude their competitors and serve
their own interests. That did not gain them any friends in the military.
Morsi, as he
admitted himself, committed many mistakes in one year. He governed erratically
and did not solve any of the serious problems his country faced. Increasingly,
he behaved like a president for those who elected him, not of all Egyptians.
Consequently many Egyptians, more than 22 million of them, felt that he did not
achieve any of the goals of the revolution and they rose up against him. These
protesters found allies in the military and security forces—the very same
institutions Morsi coaxed in order to buy their loyalty as he focused on
clipping the wings of judges, journalists, NGO activists, and leaders of other civil
society institutions. It is clear that without the massive protest, the
military would not have overthrown an elected leader. The military leaders
contend that they took the side of the people.
4. Is the June
30th protest representative majority of the Egyptian people?
There is no way
to know for sure. But it is a fact that a significant segment of the Egyptian
people was not happy with Morsi’s decisions and Morsi’s performance. Some
Egyptians felt that he violated the law and risked the lives of Egyptian
citizens. But revolutions are hardly about majority’s wishes. Most revolutions
succeeded with less than ten percent popular support. In politics, it is the
nature of the grievances that is more important than popular support.
One should not
forget that only 51% of 51% of the Egyptians voted for Morsi. That low turnout
is not the kind of mandate that would allow a president to govern without checks.
More Algerian voters voted in 1991 (60.07%) and even more Tunisian voters (90%)
cast ballots than Egyptians, in terms of voters turnout.
In the end, two
key events that are hardly mentioned in the media but must be seen as the
most significant moments that convinced many Egyptians that Morsi (or the
Brotherhood) is not ready to govern. These two events solidified the perception
that Morsi is a sectarian president whose main goal is to serve the interests
of the Muslim Brotherhood even if that risked hurting Egyptian citizens. The
first event is his participation in gathering of ultra-conservative religious
figures who justified the war in Syria on sectarian grounds. Speeches from
that event, along with fatwas from the Brotherhood’s spiritual leader, Yousef
Qaradawi, amplified sectarian strife and charged an already tense situation. Many
Egyptians saw his participation in that program as tacit approval of the acts
and beliefs of religious fanatics. The second event, the gruesome murder and desecration of the bodies of Egyptian
citizens, left a sense of shame and disgust in all Egyptians who saw those
images of Egyptians being beaten, killed, and dragged in the streets simply
because they were Shi`a. Morsi’s casual condemnation (via a presidential press
release) of the barbaric act revealed his sectarian bias and lack of respect
for human dignity. That alone is a legitimate cause for impeachment.
5. What will
happen now?
The worst case
scenario is for the Muslim Brotherhood to rely on their supporters to resist
the sacking of Morsi. The revolution was not about bringing them to power. The
revolution was about better governance and more respect for the dignity of all
Egyptians. Bringing Morsi back to power cannot be seen as a fulfillment of
revolutionary aspirations. If they insist on fighting to bring Morsi back to
power in the name of “legitimacy”, they will increase the polarization of
Egyptian society and create space for violent elements to take up arms. That
would mean the start of a civil war similar to the one that took place in
Algeria after the 1991 elections and not that different from the one going on
in Syria now. This is bad for everyone and especially the Muslim Brotherhood
because it will be them against their opponents and that is not a battle that
is in the interest of Egypt. There are reports that some fringe groups gave
already called for jihad in Egypt. If the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood do
not take a clear and firm stand against violence, they will be shunned by more
Egyptians and lose more credibility.
The low turnout
in previous elections leaves room for the interim government to replicate the
acts of the Muslim Brotherhood and claim legitimacy as well. It will be easy
for the current interim regime to amend the constitution and have it pass with
a healthy majority. It will be in the interest of the Muslim Brotherhood to
participate in the new process rather than make it about Morsi and legitimacy.
Many dictators were legitimately elected, too.
The best
scenario is for the interim president to act quickly. Make the needed changes
to the constitution to protect minorities and safeguard civil liberties, hold a
referendum on the amended constitution, and organize parliamentarian and
presidential elections. Only by building the necessary institutions of
governance that will protect the rights of all Egyptians can Egypt move out of
its current crisis. The current government cannot make the same mistakes the
Brotherhood made. They must act quickly and transparently.
If the Muslim
Brotherhood insists on returning Morsi to power instead of moving forward with
reform, they will be seen by more people as being interested in power not in
solving the country’s problems. That perception can end their legacy in Egypt
and elsewhere.
____________
* Prof. SOUAIAIA teaches at the University
of Iowa. Opinions are the author’s, speaking on matters of public interest; not
speaking for the university or any other organization with which he is
affiliated.
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